I offer a normative argument for a collaborative approach to teaching ethical issues in the sciences. Teaching science ethics requires expertise in at least two knowledge domains-the relevant science(s) and philosophical ethics. Accomplishing the aims of ethics education, while ensuring that science ethics discussions remain grounded in the best empirical science, can generally best be done through collaboration between a scientist and an ethicist. Ethics as a discipline is in danger of being misrepresented or distorted if presented by someone who lacks appropriate disciplinary training and experience. While there are exceptions, I take philosophy to be the most appropriate disciplinary domain in which to gain training in ethics teaching. Science students, who must be prepared to engage with many science ethics issues, are poorly served if their education includes a misrepresentation of ethics or specific issues. Students are less well prepared to engage specific issues in science ethics if they lack an appreciation of the resources the discipline of ethics provides. My collaborative proposal looks at a variety of ways scientists and ethicists might collaborate in the classroom to foster good science ethics education.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent blog posting on science and policy at NPR. org, physicist Adam Frank, speaking specifically of climate change but using it as but one example of many sciencerelevant policy issues, said, "But when it comes to telling us what we should do about climate change-a question that hinges on values as much as on data-scientists are not in a privileged position" (2) . Ethical issues in the sciences-what I will refer to here as "science ethics"-include, in addition to global climate change, ethical issues such as the creation of transgenic organisms, the use of reproductive, genetic, and biomedical enhancement technologies, the conduct of research with human and animal subjects, the allocation and prioritization of research dollars, and so on. Scientists are generally aware that a good science education has to engage these sorts of issues. Indeed, I will mostly assume for the remainder of this article that scientists agree on the importance of including these issues in a good education.
But how should science ethics education be done? After all, as Adam Frank points out in his article, scientists typically do not have training in ethics, and they are not in any kind of privileged position with respect to issues in science ethics. These issues are not resolved by gathering more data because the data do not indicate, apart from ethical argument, what we ought to do with what we know. In this article, I will argue for collaborative science ethics education, drawing on the separate but equally valuable strengths of two very different domains and methods of inquiry. In particular, I will argue that science ethics teaching should combine the strengths of scientists and philosophically trained ethicists, ideally those with training and experience in practical ethics. As I hope to show, science ethics involves at least two domains of knowledge. Rather than assume that one professor has expertise in both areas, scientists and ethicists should combine forces in the classroom to provide the best science ethics education for students. I understand my proposal to be relevant to undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate education.
Before making my argument, I do want to offer some context for my proposal. First of all, I am assuming some sort of meaningful distinction between the disciplines of science and ethics. While I will not go into any detail on how this distinction might be made, I do offer the following rough characterization. The sciences deal with description of reality, as best we can know it at this time. They attempt to say how things are in the world. Ethics is fundamentally normative. That is, it investigates how things ought to be in the world. There are some very different methodologies used within these two disciplines, but I take the descriptive/normative distinction to be fundamental. Philosophy is, in recent history, the typical home discipline of normative ethics. Some of the recommendations I make later concern what might be thought of as metaethical claims. The distinction between metaethics and normative ethics is not entirely clear and is sometimes contested (4) . But even when I refer to metaethical concepts, I do so by way of making normative recommendations about how they ought to be handled in teaching ethics. There is also a good deal of overlap between science ethics and science policy. Policies are also normative in nature, but not all science ethics issues need be expressed in the form of policy, just as not all ethical norms need be codified in law. Science policy represents, in most cases, a consensus view, whereas many issues in ethics remain contested (10) .
To anticipate a possible confusion, it is possible to do descriptive ethical work. That is, social scientists might investigate the question of what individuals' views are on ethical questions. This should not be confused with normative ethics, which raises the question, for instance, of whether the majority view is the best or the right one. Social scientists who study the ethical views of others, in fact, might consider my proposal here as applying to them as well. Their students, too, would likely benefit from collaborative education on issues at the intersection of social science and ethics.
PHILOSOPHERS TEACHING SCIENCE?
Consider this scenario: a professor with a Ph.D. in philosophy, hired by a university philosophy department, who proposes to teach a science course. This would, I think, be greeted with suspicion or perhaps hostility. I have heard of universities that support a department's right to control who can teach courses in the department's area. There may even be in some places formal policies related to this patrolling of disciplinary boundaries. Setting aside university politics, there seem to be some good reasons to prevent a philosopher from teaching a science course.
In short, it is not this person's area of expertise or competence. No one should think that earning a Ph.D. in one area enables that individual to teach competently in another area altogether. Different disciplines have different methodologies and bodies of knowledge. While someone with advanced graduate education in one area might be able to learn some new area, it is doubtful that in the typical case they can learn it as thoroughly as others whose training and experience in that area go back many years. At the least, such an individual would be comparatively underprepared to teach the course.
In making my case, I will hereafter assume the qualifier that it is unlikely that someone taking up a new discipline could do so as well as someone whose training and experience are in that area. There will be exceptions, but this does not undermine the more general claim. As a matter of efficiency, we might ask whether it makes sense to learn some new discipline in which the university already has faculty expertise.
Scientists who hear of this philosophy professor's plans would have good reason to question whether the philosopher is properly qualified to teach in their area for other reasons as well. This course would represent the discipline to students. Scientists might worry about someone who lacks qualification misrepresenting the state of knowledge in a way that parallels the potential misrepresentation of scientific discoveries in the popular media. Students might be drawn away from a better course offered by a scientist with training in the relevant area. It would also be unhelpful for students to have the impression that they have learned "those" issues and thereby be less inclined to seek further, better training in the area. More positively, a scientist could probably offer a better science course than the philosopher. The modern university has to be concerned about the quality of education students receive. Ensuring that the person charged with teaching a given course is properly credentialed to do so is a matter of some concern in a university eager to show the value of its degrees.
To summarize, there are reasons related to disciplinary competence, budgetary and university efficiency, the representation of a discipline to students and others, and the quality of students' educational experience that could be used to support opposition to this proposal. When we reverse the scenario and think about scientists teaching ethical issues related to their discipline, I want to argue that these and other reasons support the opposite claim-that it would be better to have someone who has disciplinary training in ethics teaching ethics. But as I noted when indicating my proposal above, because ethical issues in science generally involve both scientific and philosophical/ethical claims and issues, the best approach will be a collaborative one in which both a scientist and an ethicist participate.
SCIENTISTS TEACHING ETHICS?
If philosophers ought not-generally-teach science courses, scientists ought not teach ethics courses. If scientists ought not teach whole courses on ethics, what about incorporating ethics into their courses? For instance, a course in biology might include some discussion of research ethics or look at the ethical implications of genetics. A graduate program might incorporate ethics into courses or occasional seminar presentations on professional issues, such as the responsible conduct of research (8) . In each of these contexts, I believe it would be best to have someone with the relevant training in ethics involved in the teaching. Why not bring in someone whose training and experience best position them to teach the normative aspects of the issue?
Scientists might respond to this proposal with the following: "We do not intend to start teaching ethics courses, but we do believe it is important to look at the social impacts of the science we teach. This includes looking at the ethical issues associated with the science. And this is not a discussion of ethics in general. Rather, it is a discussion of science ethics. While philosophers should teach the subject of ethics, we reserve the right to teach science ethics because it is directly linked to our discipline."
To this I respond that we should recognize that science ethics involves disciplinary expertise in at least two areas. There is the relevant science. But there are also the normative issues, captured by questions like "Can genetic testing be done in a way that does not foster discriminatory attitudes?" Hence, I offer a collaborative proposal. The view in opposition to my proposal is essentially that scientists can cover both the empirical claims and the normative issues. Why insist on covering both domains, assuming there are possibilities for collaboration?
To return to the claim that science ethics is distinct from philosophical ethics and can be adequately covered by scientists alone, let us consider a particular issue to highlight the value of collaborative teaching. The ethics of embryonic stem cell research has generated an enormous amount of public discussion. It has been the subject of reflection by at least two presidentially-appointed bioethics councils (5, 6) . And it has generated a substantial number of books and articles in bioethics. It is a perfect example of the importance of collaborative teaching.
ETHICS AND EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH AS A CASE OF COLLABORATIVE TEACHING
One of the most fundamental ethical issues of embryonic stem cell research is the moral status of human lives at the earliest stages of development. The question of when moral status for humans begins probably cannot be answered in ignorance of the science of embryonic development. A good grounding in the relevant science is important. It is possible for individuals to attempt to defend views that are based on counterfactual claims about embryos. Having the science right is therefore important. But the science alone will not yield an answer to the question of when moral status begins. A claim about moral status and an argument for that claim will also require the use of normative concepts. It is not enough to know about particular biological changes that occur during development. To make an argument for moral status beginning here as opposed to there, one must also argue for why that particular change is relevant to moral status.
For instance, a view that says that not all humans are persons and that being a person is a necessary feature of having moral status must meet a number of objectives to secure that claim. We need an account of why these personmaking features ground moral status (3) . Addressing this goes beyond the relevant science.
And it would not be enough to talk only about one position on the issue. Even if one had a handle on the personhood view, a responsible presentation of the ethics of this issue should also explain and offer arguments for respectable alternative views. Indeed it would be an ethical failing on the part of a teacher not to teach alternative views where there are respectable ones, as is the case with moral status (1).
Further, good ethics education would involve attempts to bring, as much as possible, respectable alternative views into conversation with one another in the classroom. If there is active work among proponents of alternative views who are responding to one another's objections and offering further reasons to believe their own view is the best one, this ought to be discussed. To do otherwise would be to misrepresent the current state of inquiry.
My aim here is to show that it would take more than training in biology to teach the ethics of moral status. It would also take more than training in ethics to effectively teach this topic. The moral status of early human lives is a perfect example of the importance of collaborative teaching in which both relevant disciplines are properly represented. In the latter paragraphs of this section, I have begun to appeal to some of the aims of ethics education. Table 1 offers a more detailed description of some basic aims of ethics education. It sets an ambitious agenda but also gives a sense of what responsible ethics education should seek to achieve. Philosophers need not claim to be able to do all of this by themselves. But theirs is a necessary contribution to a collaborative effort.
A COLLABORATIVE PROPOSAL
My proposal: science ethics education should be collaborative. Scientists bring to the classroom expertise in the empirical data and the scientific method and experience with these. Ethicists bring expertise in making, defending, and critically examining normative claims. When it comes to teaching science ethics, I believe the best education will come from bringing both sets of strengths into the classroom together. Below, I offer some models for implementing collaborative teaching. But let me address one possible response here. Some might say that each can have their respective strengths in their own classrooms. However, I believe it is better to have ethicists visiting in science classes and scientists visiting in philosophy classes. This shows that the scientist, who generally has disciplinary credibility with students, recognizes the importance of ethical issues. They are not something to be discussed somewhere else, but have a place in the midst of a science curriculum. For ethicists teaching science-related philosophy classes, inviting in scientists signals a commitment to working with the best possible empirical information when discussing ethical issues.
SOME MODELS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
There are many ways my collaborative proposal could be implemented in practice. I offer one example with which I am familiar, but also discuss a number of other possible forms of implementation. Each fall I teach a 500-level course titled Bioethics. This course is populated almost entirely by science graduate students. After a couple of weeks introducing ethics as a discipline, the course looks at a variety of specific issues: the use of human embryos, reproductive and genetic technologies, plant biotechnologies, neuroscience, the use of human/animal research subjects, the responsible conduct of research, etc. When we discuss, for example, the ethics of reproductive technologies, I invite in a scientist whose research and teaching are in the area of reproductive science. He presents for about 20 to 30 minutes, before the remainder of the class is devoted to discussion of ethical issues related to that area of science. The visiting scientist stays and participates in the discussion, sometimes addressing questions about the science, sometimes offering views on how different ethical positions match with current scientific practice, etc.
Another option is guest lectures. Having a professor visit another's class allows the visiting professor to demonstrate their approach to the content. Still another is a co-taught course. If the subject is sufficiently interdisciplinary (e.g., Biology in Society), the ethical and scientific issues might be so interwoven throughout that it makes sense to have both professors active in each discussion. The push is toward interdisciplinary activity in the contemporary university, and courses that bridge scientific and ethical issues would be among the more important ones in this respect.
CONCLUSION
I have argued here for collaborative science ethics teaching, drawing on the strengths of the sciences and ethics to promote better education for students. Not only does such collaboration promote good pedagogy, it also fosters collegiality across disciplines. The alleged "two cultures" meet in science ethics. Teaching together allows professors to appreciate one another's strengths rather than give the impression that they can do each other's work. I see no good reasons to resist collaboration here. To identify a broad range of considerations that might be relevant to the intellectual or practical resolution of an issue
To weigh various ethical considerations and assign relative importance to some over others, based on personal, professional, or social values
To learn to articulate internally consistent reasons to support normative judgments and to hold views that are consistent across issues
To understand the ethical significance of seeing the sciences as professions To appreciate how the motivation to do a good job as a scientist is intrinsically linked to certain character traits like integrity, persistence, intellectual humility, and others (7) To come to a relatively unified understanding of the place of ethics in successful scientific research and the professions (9) To appreciate that the fact of moral disagreement does not necessarily entail that the other view is irrational
To learn from engagements with representatives of views other than one's own To be able to explain why someone might disagree with one's own view and to offer responses to objections and clarify why one continues to hold one's own view
